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INTRODUCTION
Bleibtreu & Königsgruber (2015), who studied political connections, corporate governance and financial reporting, opined that corporate political connections are a global phenomenon and that it creates complex economic consequences. Some scholars also pointed the trend of political connections and financial reporting occurred both in emerging markets and developed economies. Cheema, Munir & Su (2016) and Chen, Ding & Kim (2010) for example, inferred that political connections affect corporate performance, thus developed economic consequence.
There is also empirical evidence that confers similar observation, i.e. political connections influenced corporate performance. Studies assert that politically influenced firms were more involved in accruals earnings management (Al-dhamari & Ismail, 2015; Chaney, Faccio & Parsley, 2011; and Balkaoui, 2004) hence, affect firm performance. Faccio (2006) , for example, concluded that there is a positive relationship between the two, political connection and firm value. Like Faccio, other researchers also found similar outcome (Wu, Wu, Zhou & Wu, 2012; and Li, Meng, Wang & Zhou, 2008) , where they found politically influenced firms involved in managing earnings and producing less transparent earnings to hide their political rents which they get from their connections (Braam et al., 2015; and Chaney et al., 2011) . Some even associated political connections to business practices (Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006) .
Pakistan is not excluded from the abovementioned phenomenon. Some even view that the corruption in Pakistan escalates that political connections influenced on earnings management (Saeed, Belghitar & Clark, 2015) . This paper argues based on the theory of political connection, which precept that there is interdependence between corporate political connectedness and financial reporting. The theory builds on the assertion that corporate political connections affect the government's roles, which are: the power to affect corporate well-being and mediates conflict between corporate actors (Bleibtreu & Königsgruber, 2015) . The theory provides predictions that inform the effect between political connections and reporting quality. The theory suggests that political connection leads to reporting manipulation.
Grounded by the said theory, this paper argued that it is highly likely that there is a relationship between political influences and earnings management. This paper examines the relationship between the politically influenced firms and earnings quality (measured as earnings opacity and accruals earnings management). Specifically, this paper investigates whether accruals earnings management and earnings opacity differ between politically influenced firms and non-politically influenced firms. The paper contributes to the growing literature on earnings quality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, synthesise previous studies, followed by the construct of accruals earnings management (accruals quality). Next methodology was deliberated. Subsequently, the paper discussed the finding which was later followed by the concluding remark and contribution of the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Pakistan Political Environment
The Index of Economic Freedom had rank Pakistan amongst the corrupt countries in the world (Saeed et al., 2015) . In the last 25 years, three national assemblies and their elected prime ministers have been dismissed on the charges of political patronage and corruption (Saeed et al., 2015) . In fact, the current Prime Minister (Mr Nawaz Sharif), the current opposition leader (Mr Syed Khursheed Shah), the current Finance Minister (Mr Ishaq Dar) and numerous other prominent politicians and their close relatives are facing multiple corruption cases in National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Since the establishment of Pakistan, " Pakistan has been ruling by industrialist; Ahmad Dawood (founding owner of Dawood group), Yusuf Haroon, a leading industrialist, was the first Chief Minister of Sindh province, and Rafiq Saigol (founding owner of Saigol group) held main posts in the governments and ruling parties (Saeed et al., 2015) . In general elections of 2002, 2008 , and 2013, the major political parties that participated were led by politicians representing some of the country's main business family. The majority of the prominent politicians belong to large business conglomerates coming from families that owned big businesses, such as Ittefaq Group (of current Prime Minister of Pakistan and current Chief Minister of Punjab), Air Blue (of Khaqaan Abbassi, current Federal Minister for Petroleum), Saifullah Group (of Anwar Saifullah, Former Federal Minister, and Usman Saifullah, current Senator), Service Industries (of Ahmad Mukhtar, Former Defense Minister), JW" D Group (of Jahangir Khan Tareen, Former Federal Minister, and Ahmed Mahmood, Former Governor of Punjab). In a country, where politicians have their own business interests; it is difficult to sustain a distinction between 'interests of the state' and 'business interests'. Therefore, the common perception is that politicians systematically misuse resources through the abuse of state power.
For the above-mentioned reasons, Noorani (2015) opined that the powerful bureaucrats and politicians obtain personal benefits because the conflict of interest law is weak in Pakistan. Moreover, the inefficient monitoring by the security exchange commission of Pakistan (SECP) and weak governance and legal system, resulting in the poor implementation of good corporate governance practices in Pakistan (Cheema et al., 2016). Therefore, it is expected that politically influenced firms are more likely to employ accrual-based earnings management strategy and earnings aggressiveness compare to non-politically influenced firms in order to hide their political rants. This paper hypothesized that politically influenced firms disclosed lower quality accounting information.
Empirical Evidence
Synthesizing the literature, the current study found that there is growing interest in examining political influences and firm performance. Interestingly, the literature delineates various criteria used to define political influences. Some used proxy such as board member or large shareholder is member of parliament or of government (Chaney et al., 2011) ; firms headquartered in a politician's hometown 
Politically Influenced Firms
According to (Saeed et Prior studies identify political influences as rent-seeking activities where firms use resources in bribing or lobbying to get preferential treatment and privileges from government officials. Khan and Jomo (2000) explained the rent-seeking activities; activities that involve bribing, lobbying or through political connections.
Based on the above, the current study adopted three proxies that represent political influences. They are: 1) a presence of politician's on the board of directors; one of the shareholders (control at least 10 percent of votes) or senior managers (such as President, Vice-President, Chairman, CEO or Secretary) are a member of provincial assembly or parliament, a head of state or a minister (Faccio, 2006) Based on the abovementioned, the current study adopted the following criteria:
1) A politician's full name match to a firm senior management or large shareholder if their names match exactly.
2) Review of a list of parliament or assembly members at provincial and federal level.
3) Review of a list of committee members of each political party on their website. 4) Follow the book of Rehman (2006) who identified the list of politically influenced firms in Pakistan.
5) Review the list of listed firms where government holding significant shareholding.
6) Review the website of firms who have former bureaucrats/former army officer as senior management.
MEASUREMENTS OF EARNINGS MANIPULATIONS
Studies showed that accruals quality is a measure of earnings quality (Dechow & Dichew, 2002; McNichols, 2002) . Earnings consist of accruals and cash flows, however, accruals are discretionary and based on estimates thus cash flows are considered more consistent than accruals (Dechow, 1994) . Earnings are mostly manipulated through accruals (Dechow, 2011) and numerous measures view that high accruals reduce earnings quality (Francis et al., 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2003) . As accruals give the discretion to use judgments, it provides an opportunity for earnings management (Dechow & Schrand, 2004) .
To investigate the involvement of firm in accruals earnings management, the current study employed accruals quality as a measure of earnings quality, which was introduced by Dechow & Dichev (2002) . Hence, the current study measures accruals quality by matching operating cash flows and working capital accruals; where a poor match indicates poor accruals quality. The current study regress change in working capital for last year, present, and next year's cash flow. Dechow 
TCA , is a total current accrual of firm j in year t;
 CFO is cash flows from operations of firm j in year t;  ΔREV is revenue of firm j in year t; and  PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment of firm j in year t. All the variables are scaled by lagged total assets. The variance of  is an inverse measure of earnings quality.
Subsequently, the current study adopted Bhattacharya et al. (2003) to examine earnings opacity of firms. Specifically, the current study used earnings aggressiveness model to detect earnings opacity. Earnings aggressiveness is the propensity to speed the realization of gains and delay the realization of losses, which would eventually result in more positive or high accruals (Bhattacharya, 2003) . The model delineates the magnitude of accruals as a measure of earnings quality. Bhattacharya (2003) stated that the opportunistic overstatement of earnings increases the level of total accruals. Earnings aggressiveness reduces earnings quality because it increases total accruals, and high accruals represent less persistent earnings (Dechow et al., 2010) . The current study hypothesized that the firms have high total accruals when they get involved in earnings manipulations. Leuz 
TA
 is the total assets of firm k in year t-1.
Control Variables
The current study controls several variables and used the industry as a dummy to control for sectorspecific effects. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
RESULTS
model; AEM represents accruals earnings management (accruals quality) which is measured by Modified Dechow & Dichev Model (McNichols, 2002); PI is a dummy variable which is an aggregate measure of political influences, 1 if a firm is politically influenced and 0 otherwise; PC is a dummy variable which represents a proxy of politically influenced firms, 1 in presence of politician(s) on board of directors or senior management and 0 otherwise; GOVT represents a significantly government owned firm, 1 if a firm is significantly owned by government and 0 otherwise; BUR is a dummy variable, which is 1 in presence of current/former civil/military bureaucrat(s) on board of directors or senior management; ROA represents percentage of net income over total assets; LEV is a leverage, which represents the ratio of debt and assets; SIZE is a log of total assets; GROWTH is calculated as the change between current year sales and previous year sales divided by previous sales; LOSS is a dummy variable, 1 if a firm is reporting loss and 0 otherwise; and BI" G4 represents top big audit firms, which is a dummy variable and 1 if a firm is audited by top big four audit firms and 0 otherwise.
Where: accruals quality (AQ) is a proxy for accruals earnings management. All other variables are explained in Table 1 . Equation 1 is used to test whether politically influenced (using an aggregate proxy) firms are involved in accruals earnings management. To test the sensitivity of our result, we use all three proxies of political influences as explained earlier.
In Regression (1), we find that political is significantly and positively related to accruals earnings management, implies lower accruals quality (p-value=0.000). The magnitude of the coefficient is comparatively moderate and signifies that the presence of political influences is related to 3.20% increase in the dependent variable. Moreover, all firm-specific control variables are significant in regression (1) . Consistent with prior studies, we find that the residuals of total current accruals are negatively and significantly related to return on assets, BIG4 auditors, leverage, and growth at 1 tale. In addition, size is positively and significantly related to the residuals of total current accruals at 1 tale. However, the loss is positively related, but not significant. In addition, Table 2 presents the results from Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), in which the dependent variable is the total accruals computed in equation (2) computed over a 5 year period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . In the regressions, the dependent variable is converted into an absolute value and then multiplied by negative 1. All the explanatory variables and control variables are same as above in equation 1.
To test our hypotheses, we use the following regression:
Where: all variables are explained in the previous section and in Table 1 . Following (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) , Equation 2 is used to test whether politically influenced (using an aggregate proxy) firms are related to earnings aggressiveness. To test the sensitivity of our result, we use all three proxies of political influences as explained earlier.
In Regression (2), we find that political is significantly and positively related to earnings aggressiveness, implies lack transparency (pvalue=0.012). The magnitude of the coefficient is comparatively moderate and signifies that the presence of political influences is related to 2.75% increase in the dependent variable. Moreover, consistent with prior studies, we find that the total accruals are negatively and significantly related to leverage and growth." However, return on assets are also negatively related to total accruals, but not significant. In addition, BIG4 auditors, loss, and size are positively related to total accruals, but not significant.
Robustness
To check the robustness of our result in Table 3 , this study regress residuals of total current accruals with three proxies of political influences instead of combined measure of political influences (i.e. political connections through political board of directors (PC), significant government shareholding (GOVT), and civil or military bureaucracy in board of directors (BUR)). The result of alternative measure is consistent with the main result. We find that all three proxies of political influences are significantly and positively related to accruals earnings management. In addition, to check the robustness of our result for regression 2 in Table 3 , we regress total accruals with three proxies of political influences as explained earlier. The result of alternative measure is largely consistent with the main result. The result shows that the proxy of political influences (i.e. political connections and bureaucracy) is positively and significantly related to earnings aggressiveness. Moreover, significant government ownership is positively related to earnings aggressiveness, but not significant.
DISCUSSION
The findings indicate that politically influenced firms have lower earnings quality (accruals quality and earnings aggressiveness) comparing to nonpolitically influenced firms. In addition, the results show that politically influenced firms are significantly and positively related to accruals earnings management and earnings opacity. Therefore, politically influenced firms established in Pakistan with relatively weak regulatory bodies and institutes involve more in accruals earnings management activities and lack transparency.
Results from additional analysis also showed that politically influenced firms are related to lower earnings quality. This probably linked to the factors that benefit the politically influenced firms to hide their political rants. In general, the findings are The current study also examined whether politically influenced firms are involved in accruals earnings management and earnings aggressiveness. The current study found that politically influenced are more involved in accruals earnings management, implying lower earnings quality. In addition, compare to non-politically influenced firms, politically influenced (political connected BOD and bureaucracy in BOD) firms are significantly and positively related to earnings aggressiveness. However, government owned firms are positively related to earnings aggressiveness, but not significant.
Additional results show that amongst the politically influenced firms, political connections from ruling party are less involved in real earnings management compare to political connections from the opposition party. However, the results are not significant amongst politically influenced firms when using accruals earnings management measure. Related to earnings management, these findings have numerous important implications for accounting practices. First, the results could be helpful for investors and other stakeholders in assessing the financial reporting quality of the politically influenced firms, which shows that politically influenced firms involved in accruals earnings management and lack transparency. Second, our results show ways to regulatory bodies to improve the quality of financial reporting and existing governance systems. Post implementations of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, researchers were expecting a reduction in earnings management. However, our results show that politically influenced firms are still involved in accruals earnings management and lack transparency since they protect their political rants and have more incentives to manipulate earnings.
CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the growing literature in the field of corporate governance related to earnings management in many ways. First, the findings add to the existing literature of political influences and earnings management, by providing more detailed investigation between political influences and earnings management. This study gives more insight while using three proxies of political influences and two measures of earnings management. The present study also contributed by testing the difference in effect between ruling party political connections and opposition party political connections on earnings management. Therefore, an important contribution of this study to the existing literature of political influences and earnings management is that it offers more detailed empirical insights using data from a less-studied and less-regulated environment i.e. South Asia (specifically Pakistan).
Secondly, the study contributes theoretically to political influences and earnings management by examining how politically connected people influence firms' management to report manipulated earnings. The findings of the current study also suggest that it does not matter if firms are ruling or opposition; connected firms on any mentioned criteria are reporting manipulated earnings. Thus, the findings of the current study give insights that the political influences through any mean provides incentives to the managers and weaken the earnings quality. This study also enables shareholders to identify which factors should be taken into consideration when evaluating a firms' earnings quality.
Current study possesses potential limitations, which readers must aware when interpreting the findings. Although, this study provides detailed investigation, but did not consider all earnings management (manipulation) models. For example, real earnings management, earnings smoothing, discretionary accruals etc. Future study can do a more longitudinal study by extending the number of years to ten years, and make a comparative study of two elected governments by including two tenure of the elected government instead one tenure of the elected government.
